Stop Identity-Based Attacks Before Privilege Escalation
Credential spray, MFA bypass, and session token hijacking generate events exclusively in identity provider logs — Okta System Log, Entra ID sign-in logs, Active Directory event IDs 4625 and 4648. Your EDR does not see these. Your SIEM sees them as low-priority authentication noise. ThretVyn's three-source correlation connects the identity event to the cloud and endpoint activity that follows, surfacing the kill chain your EDR-centric tooling cannot detect alone. ThretVyn does not replace dedicated identity security tooling such as Microsoft Entra ID Protection or Okta ThreatInsight — it reads their event output and correlates across the boundary.
Identity Attack Patterns We Detect
Sequential failed auth attempts correlated with a successful login from an unusual location, followed by immediate cloud API usage — the classic spray-and-pivot chain.
Logins from geographically impossible locations within short time windows, correlated with cloud resource creation or data access that confirms active exploitation.
Stolen session tokens reused from a new client device or geo, correlated with cloud storage access or code pipeline modification events downstream.
New OAuth applications granted high-privilege scopes correlated with elevated API activity and identity provider admin events — flagging persistent access backdoors.
Admin account used across multiple endpoints in rapid succession, correlated with shadow IT cloud creation and unusual outbound connection patterns.
Unusual service ticket requests in Active Directory event logs correlated with subsequent LSASS access attempts on endpoints — identifying offline hash-cracking attempts.
Connect Identity Sources in 15 Minutes
Okta, Entra ID, and Active Directory available across all tiers.